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NEW MEXICO’S ILLUSORY APPROACH TO MINIMUM LIMITS UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE AND UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE

Uninsured motorist coverage (“UM”) and underinsured motorist coverage (“UIM”) are bountiful sources of litigation and case law in New Mexico.  These coverages are also a major challenge for property and casualty insurers that provide UM and UIM to New Mexico policyholders.  Over time, these coverages and this area of law have gained in complexity with each additional appellate decision.  This article will discuss several recent appellate decisions that have further complicated this coverage by declaring that minimum limits UIM coverage is illusory, but the coverage may still be sold by insurers with proper disclosure.

I. Statutory Framework for Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist Coverage

In New Mexico, UM coverage is required by statute.[1]  UIM is a subcategory of UM.[2]  The UM statute is intended to expand insurance coverage and to protect individual members of the public against the hazard of culpable uninsured motorists.[3]  By requiring insurers to offer UM coverage, the New Mexico Legislature wanted to encourage insureds to purchase such coverage.[4]    The UM statute defines “underinsured motorist” as “an operator of a motor vehicle with respect to the ownership, maintenance or use of which the sum of the limits of liability under all bodily injury liability insurance applicable at the time of the accident is less than the limits of liability under the insured’s uninsured motorist coverage.”[5]  While seemingly straightforward from statutory perspective, the UM statute is liberally interpreted in order to implement its remedial purpose, and the language in the UM/UIM statute that provides for an exception to UM coverage is construed strictly to protect insureds.[6]

The UM statute incorporates a specific section of New Mexico’s Mandatory Financial Responsibility Act, which requires all motorists to carry minimum limits liability coverage of $25,000 per person and $50,000 per occurrence.[7]  The UM statute provides that an insured may purchase more UM/UIM coverage, but the amount of UM/UIM coverage purchased by the insured may not exceed the total amount of liability coverage purchased.[8]  If the insured purchases higher than minimum liability coverage, the insured may purchase higher than minimum UM/UIM coverage.  These statutes combined (§§ 66-5-215(A)(1)-(2) and 66-5-301(A)-(B)) require motorists to carry liability insurance limits of at least $25,000 per person and $50,000 per occurrence and UM coverage, which includes UIM coverage, of at least the same amount.  However, the UM statute also provides the option to insureds to reject the UM coverage.[9]

II. Illusory Coverage – Crutcher v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company

In Crutcher v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., the New Mexico Supreme Court considered the question of whether the UIM coverage on a policy that provides minimum UM/UIM limits of $25,000 per person and $50,000 per accident is illusory for an insured who sustains more than $25,000 in damages caused by a minimally insured tortfeasor.[10]  A majority concluded that this type of policy is illusory to the extent that it may mislead minimum limits UM/UIM policyholders to believe that they will receive UIM benefits when there is a possibility that the insured may never receive such a benefit.[11]  The majority held that an insurer must adequately disclose the limitations of minimum UM/UIM coverage to specifically inform the policyholder that the policyholder may never receive UIM coverage.[12]

a. Gap Theory vs. Excess Theory

In considering whether the minimum limits UIM coverage was illusory, the Supreme Court first reviewed the competing theories of UIM coverage.  The Court noted that there are two theories of coverage that a jurisdiction may adopt related to the amount of coverage provided by a jurisdiction’s statute:  (1) gap theory;  or (2) excess theory or floating layer theory.[13]  In jurisdictions that adopt the gap theory, UIM coverage will compensate an injured insured up to the amount of UIM protection purchased.[14]  In jurisdictions that adopt the excess theory or floating layer theory, UIM will fully compensate an injured insured for the cost of the driver’s damages even if the total is more than what the driver purchased in UIM coverage.[15]  In Schmick v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., the New Mexico Supreme Court adopted the gap theory of coverage, because “the most an insured can receive is the amount of underinsurance purchased for [the insured’s] benefit, [and] that amount must be offset by available liability proceeds.”[16]

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In this issue...

NEW MEXICO’S ILLUSORY MINIMUM LIMITS FOR UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE

Posted on 8/21/2025
This article will discuss several recent appellate decisions that have further complicated this coverage by declaring that minimum limits UIM coverage is illusory, but the coverage may still be sold by insurers with proper disclosure.

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Many factors have affected the Florida homeowner’s insurance market over the past several decades – some helpful, some harmful. This Article will discuss just five of these factors.

NEW MEXICO’S ILLUSORY MINIMUM LIMITS FOR UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE

Posted on 8/21/2025
This article will discuss several recent appellate decisions that have further complicated this coverage by declaring that minimum limits UIM coverage is illusory, but the coverage may still be sold by insurers with proper disclosure.

DISTINCT LEGAL ISSUES AFFECTING REINSURANCE INTERMEDIARIES

Posted on 8/21/2025
Reinsurance is a contract which one insurance company, the “reinsurer”, agrees to indemnify another insurance company, “ceding insurer”, in whole or in part against loss or liability arising from an insurance contract issued by the ceding insurer.

DISTINCT LEGAL ISSUES AFFECTING REINSURANCE INTERMEDIARIES

Posted on 8/21/2025
Reinsurance is a contract which one insurance company, the “reinsurer”, agrees to indemnify another insurance company, “ceding insurer”, in whole or in part against loss or liability arising from an insurance contract issued by the ceding insurer.

b. The Statutory Offset Rule

In Schmick, the Supreme Court determined that the New Mexico Legislature intended to “put an injured insured in the same position he would have been in had the tortfeasor had liability coverage in an amount equal to the uninsured/underinsured motorist protection purchased for the insured’s benefit.”[17]  The Schmick Court noted that “the underinsurance coverage . . . [is] not in addition to that provided by the other vehicle but [is] intended to supplement the amount paid by the underinsured motorist so that the insured recover[s] an amount equal to the uninsured motorist protection purchased.”[18]  Consistent with this legislative intent, the Schmick Court determined that, “under a statute like ours, where the most an insured can receive is the amount of underinsurance purchased for [the insured’s] benefit, that amount must be offset by available liability proceeds.”[19]

Pursuant to this offset rule, UIM benefits are calculated by subtracting the amount of the insured’s UM coverage from the amount of the tortfeasor’s liability coverage.[20]  The Crutcher majority noted that a significant consequence of this rule is that, if injured persons purchased only the statutory minimum policy, that person’s policy will not cover losses for damages in excess of $25,000.[21]  The majority stated that the collection of UIM insurance is, therefore, practically impossible for minimally insured motorists.[22]

It is worth noting, and the majority of the Court acknowledged, that Mr. Crutcher’s claim was not denied based on the statutory offset rule.[23]  The insurer denied Mr. Crutcher’s claim based on a determination that the tortfeasor did not meet the definition of an uninsured motorist pursuant to the statute, because the total limits of liability insurance were equal to Mr. Crutcher’s UM/UIM coverage limits.[24]  Even though the denial of Mr. Crutcher’s claim was not based on the offset rule, the insurer agreed that the application of the offset rule would have resulted in no UIM payment.[25] 

c. Majority’s Holding of Illusory Coverage

The Supreme Court in Crutcher noted that it has long held the “courts of New Mexico assume the average purchaser of automobile insurance will have limited knowledge of insurance law, and we will not impose on the consumer an expectation that she or he will be able to make an informed decision as to the amount of UM/UIM coverage desired or required without first receiving information from the insurance company.”[26]  The Court perpetuated this view of the law and plainly stated that “[w]e refuse to impose on the insured the obligation to be aware of and understand the consequences of New Mexico’s UM/UIM statutory provisions, much less the offset rule derived by its technical language.”[27] 

The Court’s majority then struggled with two concurrent facts, specifically that policyholders with minimum limits UM/UIM coverage will receive benefits if injured by a tortfeasor without insurance, and those same policyholders may receive no benefits in some UIM circumstances.  The majority stated that the fact that insured will receive some benefit from minimum limit UM/UIM policies only demonstrates that insurers are properly disclosing that the policy covers half of the risk purportedly covered by a minimum limits UM/UIM policy.[28]  The majority was persuaded by Mr. Crutcher’s argument that the minimum limits UM/UIM coverage is illusory, because it was misleading to the average insurance purchaser.[29]  The majority grudgingly acknowledged that the UM/UIM coverage was not illusory based on its definition, but it then agreed with Mr. Crutcher that minimum UM/UIM coverage is misleading because policyholders are not adequately informed that they are not eligible to receive UIM coverage.[30] 

The Court noted that the New Mexico Legislature has purposefully chosen to adopt a gap theory of underinsurance coverage, and the Court stated that New Mexico lawmakers are empowered to revisit the state’s UM/UIM coverage statutory scheme in light of the issues considered in Crutcher.[31]  The Court found itself bound by the language chosen by the New Mexico Legislature.[32]  Importantly, the Court’s review of the applicable statutory language made clear that the sale of UM/UIM insurance is reflective of the statutory scheme purposefully selected by the New Mexico Legislature.[33]  The Court agreed that the law allows an insurer to sell minimum limits UM/UIM coverage to a policyholder and only provide coverage for UM and that law allows insurers to charge a premium for such coverage as long as they make a proper disclosure to the policyholder.[34]

The Court held that in order to fulfill the UM/UIM statute’s legislative purpose of placing the burden on the policyholders to determine how much protection they would like to purchase, the policyholders must be fully informed of the relative benefits and limitations of a given policy.[35]  The Court held that insurers must explicitly disclose to policyholders the potential outcome where the policyholder is not eligible to receive UIM coverage pursuant to the Mandatory Financial Accountability Act and the corresponding offset rule articulated in Schmick.[36]  The Court held that the insurer shall bear this burden of disclosure to the policyholder that a purchase of the minimum limits UM/UIM coverage may come with the counterintuitive exclusion of UIM coverage if the insured is concerned about the potential of being in an accident with a tortfeasor who carries minimum limits liability insurance.[37]  This burden of disclosure creates complexity for both insureds and insurers, because it is impossible to predict the level of liability coverage carried by future tortfeasors.  The Court stated that without this disclosure, an insurer may not charge a premium for minimum UIM coverage.[38]

d. The Dissent in Crutcher

The decision in Crutcher was not unanimous, and the opinion contains a well-reasoned dissent.  The dissent views the majority’s holding as resting on two flawed premises, and the dissent states that the disclosure mandated of insurance companies was incorrect and likely to generate confusion.[39] 

According to the dissent, the first flawed premise was the majority’s view that insureds expect UIM coverage to be make-whole coverage (i.e., excess theory coverage).[40]  The dissent noted that UIM coverage in New Mexico has never been so defined.  The statutory law in New Mexico instead provides for “gap theory” coverage that compensates an injured insured up to the amount of UM/UIM coverage purchased and not up to the amount of the injured insured’s damages.[41] 

The second flawed premise according to the dissent was the premise that New Mexico’s UM/UIM statute never, in practice, provides UIM benefits to insureds with minimum-limits policies.[42]  The dissent stated that this assertion was inaccurate. It then noted specific examples where an insured with minimum UM/UIM coverage may receive benefits from the coverage (e.g. where either an insured has minimum limits UM/UIM coverage on multiple vehicles or an insured has multiple minimum limits UM/UIM policies available and that insured is allowed to stack coverages and recover UIM benefits).[43]  The dissent noted that the insured in Schmick stacked two minimum-limits policies and received UIM benefits as a result.[44]  The dissent also noted that an accident involving multiple claimants may also entitle a claimant with minimum-limits coverage to recover UIM benefits if the liability coverage of the tortfeasor is inadequate to cover multiple claims at minimum limits.[45]

Finally, the dissent stated that burdening insurance companies with a disclosure about the effect of a coverage that is already defined, consistent with the law, in the insurance contract is a substantial departure from prior holdings.[46]  The dissent saw no basis in the law for the imposition of such a requirement and stated reservations that the majority’s holding will not meaningfully aid insureds in understanding and selecting among coverage options.[47]  

III. Retroactive Application of Crutcher

More recently, in Smith v. Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club, the New Mexico Supreme Court considered the single question of whether the rule announced in Crutcher applies prospectively or retroactively.[48]  The Court held that Crutcher applies retroactively.[49]  The Court stated that there is a rebuttable presumption that a rule announced in a New Mexico civil case, such as Crutcher, applies retroactively.[50]  The Court held that the presumption was not overcome, because the Court did not expressly declare in Crutcher that the rule applied prospectively, and Crutcher did not state a new rule of law such that the insurer was entitled to rely on pre-Crutcher authority.[51]  The Court stated that its intention was for Crutcher to apply retroactively.[52]

IV. Conclusion

With the decisions in Crutcher and Smith, the landscape in New Mexico for property and casualty insurers providing minimum limits UM/UIM coverage became incrementally more complex.  Insurers are on notice that minimum limits UM/UIM coverage, which is popular level of coverage for insurance purchasers, is considered by the New Mexico Supreme Court to contain some coverage components that are illusory.  In order to sell minimum limits UM/UIM coverage, these insurers bear the burden of disclosure to the policyholder that the purchase of the minimum limits UM/UIM coverage may result in no coverage, if the insured is in an accident with a tortfeasor who carries minimum liability insurance.  As the dissent notes, these recent pronouncements and disclosure requirements may result in more confusion than meaningful understanding by policyholders.

References

[1] NMSA 1978, § 66-5-301 (1983) (“A. No motor vehicle or automobile liability policy insuring against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily injury or death suffered by any person and for injury to or destruction of property of others arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle shall be delivered or issued for delivery in New Mexico with respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in New Mexico unless coverage is provided therein or supplemental thereto in minimum limits for bodily injury or death and for injury to or destruction of property as set forth in Section 66-5-215 NMSA 1978 and such higher limits as may be desired by the insured, but up to the limits of liability specified in bodily injury and property damage liability provisions of the insured’s policy, for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death, and for injury to or destruction of property resulting therefrom, according to the rules and regulations promulgated by, and under provisions filed with and approved by, the superintendent of insurance.”).

[2] Crutcher v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 2022-NMSC-001, ¶ 16, 501 P.3d 433.

[3] Romero v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 1990-NMSC-111, ¶ 6, 111 N.M. 154, 803 P.2d 243.

[4] Montano v. Allstate Indem. Co., 2004-NMSC-020, ¶ 16, 135 N.M. 681, 92 P.3d 1255.

[5] NMSA 1978, § 66-5-301(B) (1983) (“B. The uninsured motorist coverage described in Subsection A of this section shall include underinsured motorist coverage for persons protected by an insured’s policy.  For the purposes of this subsection, “underinsured motorist” means an operator of a motor vehicle with respect to the ownership, maintenance or use of which the sum of the limits of liability under all bodily injury liability insurance applicable at the time of the accident is less than the limits of liability under the insured’s uninsured motorist coverage.”).

[6] Romero, 1990-NMSC-111, ¶ 6.

[7] NMSA 1978, § 66-5-215 (1983) (“A.  Judgments herein referred to shall, for the purpose of the Mandatory Financial Responsibility Act only, be deemed satisfied when:  (1) twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) has been credited upon any judgment or judgments rendered in excess of that amount because of bodily injury to or death of one person as the result of any one accident;  (2) subject to the limit of twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) because of bodily injury to or death of one person, the sum of fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) has been credited upon any judgment or judgments rendered in excess of that amount because of bodily injury to or death of two or more persons as the result of any one accident;  or (3) ten thousand dollars ($10,000) has been credited upon any judgment or judgments rendered in excess of that amount because of injury to or destruction of property of others as a result of any one accident.  B.  However, payments made in settlements of any claims because of bodily injury, death or property damage arising from the accident shall be credited in reduction of the amounts provided for in this section.”).

[8] NMSA 1978, § 66-5-301(A) (1983).

[9] NMSA 1978, § 66-5-301(C) (1983) (“The named insured shall have the right to reject uninsured motorist coverage as described in Subsections A and B of this section; provided that unless the named insured requests such coverage in writing, such coverage need not be provided in or supplemental to a renewal policy where the named insured has rejected the coverage in connection with a policy previously issued to him by the same insurer.”).

[10] Crutcher v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 2022-NMSC-001, 501 P.3d 433.

[11] Crutcher, 2022-NMSC-001, ¶ 2.

[12] Id. ¶ 2

[13] Crutcher, 2022-NMSC-001, ¶ 18.

[14] Id. ¶ 18.

[15] Id. ¶ 18.

[16] Schmick v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 1985-NMSC-073, ¶ 30, 103 N.M. 216, 704 P.2d 1092.

[17] Schmick, 1985-NMSC-073, ¶ 10;  Crutcher, 2022-NMSC-001, ¶ 19.

[18] Schmick, 1985-NMSC-073, ¶ 5;  Crutcher, 2022-NMSC-001, ¶ 19.

[19] Schmick, 1985-NMSC-073, ¶ 30;  Crutcher, 2022-NMSC-001, ¶ 19.

[20] Crutcher, 2022-NMSC-001, ¶ 20;  Schmick, 1985-NMSC-073, ¶ 24 (“[A]n insured collects from his underinsured motorist carrier the difference between his uninsured motorist coverage and the tortfeasor’s liability coverage or the difference between his damages and the tortfeasor’s liability coverage, whichever is less.”).

[21] Crutcher, 2022-NMSC-001, ¶ 20.

[22] Id. ¶ 20.

[23] Crutcher, 2022-NMSC-001, ¶ 10. 

[24] Id. ¶ 10.

[25] Id. ¶ 10.

[26] Crutcher, 2022-NMSC-001, ¶ 26;  Progressive NW. Ins. Co. v. Weed Warrior Servs., 2010-NMSC-050, ¶ 13, 149 N.M. 157, 245 P.3d 1209;  Romero v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 1990-NMSC-111, ¶ 17 (“Given the realities of the automobile liability insurance business in which the unfamiliar terminology of a policy describes coverage under complex rights and obligations of personal injury and liability law, given an insured who is unsophisticated in business affairs, and given the public policy favoring insurance coverage for personal injury and liability arising from the operation of motor vehicles, we question whether the language quoted from State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Price regarding the duty to read one’s insurance policy can have very general application”).

[27] Crutcher, 2022-NMSC-001, ¶ 26.

[28] Crutcher, 2022-NMSC-001, ¶ 27.

[29] Id. ¶ 27.

[30] Crutcher, 2022-NMSC-001, ¶ 31.

[31] Crutcher, 2022-NMSC-001, ¶ 28.

[32] Id. ¶ 28.

[33] Id. ¶ 28.

[34] Id. ¶ 28.

[35] Crutcher, 2022-NMSC-001, ¶ 30.

[36] Crutcher, 2022-NMSC-001, ¶ 31.

[37] Crutcher, 2022-NMSC-001, ¶ 32.

[38] Crutcher, 2022-NMSC-001, ¶ 2.

[39] Crutcher, 2022-NMSC-001, ¶ 36.

[40] Crutcher, 2022-NMSC-001, ¶ 37.

[41] Crutcher, 2022-NMSC-001, ¶ 38.

[42] Crutcher, 2022-NMSC-001, ¶ 40.

[43] Id. ¶ 40.

[44] Crutcher, 2022-NMSC-001, ¶ 40;  Schmick, 1985-NMSC-073, ¶¶ 20-22.

[45] Crutcher, 2022-NMSC-001, ¶ 40;  Gonzales v. Millers Cas. Ins. Co. of Tex., 923 F.2d 1417, 1422 (10th Cir. 1991).

[46] Crutcher, 2022-NMSC-001, ¶ 41.

[47] Id. ¶ 41.

[48] Smith v. Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club, 2025-NMSC-004.

[49] Smith, 2025-NMSC-004, ¶ 2.

[50] Smith, 2025-NMSC-004, ¶ 2;  Beavers v. Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., 1994-NMSC-094, ¶ 22, 118 N.M. 391, 881 P.2d 1376.

[51] Smith, 2025-NMSC-004, ¶ 2.

[52] Id. ¶ 2.