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EVOLUTION OF THE FLORIDA RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY INSURANCE MARKET

1. Introduction

Many factors have affected the Florida homeowner’s insurance market over the past several decades – some helpful, some harmful. This Article will discuss just five of these factors:  (1) The geographic backdrop; (2) reform in the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew; (3) abuse in assignment of benefits, which also served as a conduit for rampant claim litigation and outright fraud; (4) the resulting period of sustained net underwriting loss; and an uptick in insolvency; and (5) the reaction to the Surfside condominium building collapse.[1]

2. Unique Geography

Florida’s distinct geography makes it especially prone to hurricane loss. To provide some perspective, Florida has had nearly twice as many hurricanes as the second most hurricane-prone state, Texas and forty percent of hurricanes that make landfall on the United States east coast hit Florida. About two-thirds of Florida occupies a peninsula between the Gulf of Mexico and the Atlantic Ocean and the Florida peninsula ranges from just 100 to 140 miles wide. Florida is the flattest state in the United States. Much of the state is at or near sea level. Florida has the longest coastline in the contiguous United States, spanning over 8,400 miles. Most Floridians live close to the coastline -- around 76 percent of the state's population lives in coastal counties such as Miami-Dade County. So, Florida has become a laboratory, of sorts, for what works and what does not.

3. Reform in the Aftermath of Hurricane Andrew

That is the backdrop for Hurricane Andrew which, on August 24, 1992, made landfall in Miami-Dade County as a Category 5 hurricane, registering wind speeds estimated as high as 165 mph. It was the costliest hurricane in the United States at the time, causing $27.3 billion in damage (in 1992 dollars). That is $61.438 billion in today’s dollars based on inflation alone. More than 25,500 homes were destroyed. Another 101,000 homes were damaged. Fifty-nine healthcare facilities, 31 public schools, 82,000 businesses, 3,300 miles of powerlines, 9,500 traffic signs and signals, plus 32,900 acres of farmland were damaged or destroyed.[2]

In Andrew’s wake, at least 16 insurance companies became insolvent.[3] Many others fled the market. It would take Florida’s remaining private insurers more than a decade to break even.

Hurricane Andrew revealed three phenomena. First, Florida’s vulnerability to hurricanes had been seriously underestimated. Second, few anticipated the true extent of damage a major storm could cause in the modern age of large coastal populations and high-value properties. Third, insurers and reinsurers realized that, to remain in business, they needed to estimate and manage their natural hazard risk more accurately. Many of the insurance market changes that have occurred nationally over the last three decades can be traced to the wakeup call delivered by Hurricane Andrew.[4]

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In this issue...

NEW MEXICO’S ILLUSORY MINIMUM LIMITS FOR UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE

Posted on 8/21/2025
This article will discuss several recent appellate decisions that have further complicated this coverage by declaring that minimum limits UIM coverage is illusory, but the coverage may still be sold by insurers with proper disclosure.

EVOLUTION OF THE FLORIDA RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY INSURANCE MARKET

Posted on 8/21/2025
Many factors have affected the Florida homeowner’s insurance market over the past several decades – some helpful, some harmful. This Article will discuss just five of these factors.

EVOLUTION OF THE FLORIDA RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY INSURANCE MARKET

Posted on 8/21/2025
Many factors have affected the Florida homeowner’s insurance market over the past several decades – some helpful, some harmful. This Article will discuss just five of these factors.

NEW MEXICO’S ILLUSORY MINIMUM LIMITS FOR UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE

Posted on 8/21/2025
This article will discuss several recent appellate decisions that have further complicated this coverage by declaring that minimum limits UIM coverage is illusory, but the coverage may still be sold by insurers with proper disclosure.

DISTINCT LEGAL ISSUES AFFECTING REINSURANCE INTERMEDIARIES

Posted on 8/21/2025
Reinsurance is a contract which one insurance company, the “reinsurer”, agrees to indemnify another insurance company, “ceding insurer”, in whole or in part against loss or liability arising from an insurance contract issued by the ceding insurer.

DISTINCT LEGAL ISSUES AFFECTING REINSURANCE INTERMEDIARIES

Posted on 8/21/2025
Reinsurance is a contract which one insurance company, the “reinsurer”, agrees to indemnify another insurance company, “ceding insurer”, in whole or in part against loss or liability arising from an insurance contract issued by the ceding insurer.

These changes include: (a) More carefully managed coastal exposure; (b) a larger role of government in insuring coastal risks; (c) the introduction of hurricane deductibles; (d) a greater use of reinsurance capital; (e) the birth and rapid evolution of sophisticated catastrophe modeling; (f) strengthened building codes and an appreciation that these codes need to be enforced, as well as a greater understanding of the need for mitigation.[5] This article will briefly touch on these changes.

A. Coastal Exposure Management

Following Newton’s Third Law of Motion, Floridians have seen that every action has a reaction. For instance, the severity of losses from Andrew caused insurers to take unprecedented steps, from cancellations and nonrenewals, to requests for large rate increases. Lawmakers reacted by calling a special legislative session in May 1993, to put a moratorium on actions insurers were taking to reduce their coastal risk.[6] In turn, insurers reacted by adopting strict underwriting standards to limit the type and amount of new business they would write.

B. Enhanced Government Involvement

Also in 1993, the state was forced to create two home insurance pools which eventually combined to form Citizens Property Insurance Corporation (“Citizens”), a not-for-profit, tax-exempt government entity whose purpose is to provide property insurance to eligible Florida property owners unable to find insurance coverage in the private market. By 2007, the Florida Legislature eliminated most barriers for customers to enter Citizens, while rolling back its rates by 20 percent or more.[7] This formalized and accelerated its growth. Citizens would eventually turn from a residual market carrier of last resort to the largest property insurer in the state. By the end of 2007, Citizens had 18 percent of the market. By the end of 2011, it had 23 percent of the market.[8] This phenomenon represented a momentous change in the makeup of the Florida residential property insurance market over a period which spanned less than two decades.

This was a dramatic change in the Florida insurance market.  At the time of Hurricane Andrew, August 24, 1992, Florida-based insurers made up six percent of the market, while the balance of the market consisted primarily of non-domestic national property insurers. Citizens had not yet come into being and the surplus lines market wrote little if any residential property insurance at the time. By December 31, 2011, Citizens held 23 percent of the market, Florida-based insurers had grown to another 45 percent of the market, “pups” (i.e., Florida-only subsidiaries of major national writers) constituted 14 percent of the market,[9] while other insurers (such as non-domestic national insurers, e.g., USAA) made up the balance of the market. By September 30, 2024, Citizens’ market share receded to 14 percent, while “pups” stayed fairly constant at 15 percent of the market. Additional capacity was found in new or existing Florida-based insurers, which now made up 58 percent of the market, leaving a balance of 13 percent of the market to national writers.[10]

C. Hurricane Deductibles

Floridians also saw the introduction of the hurricane deductible. For homeowners’ policies issued or renewed after January 1, 2006, an insurer must offer deductible options applicable to hurricane losses equal to $500, or two percent, five percent, and ten percent of the policy dwelling limits.[11]

D. Greater Use of Reinsurance

Also, in the wake of Hurricane Andrew, insurers made greater use of reinsurance, whether they wanted to or not. In 1993, Florida established a unique, mandatory public catastrophe reinsurance program. All property insurers in Florida must buy reinsurance from the state-run Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund.[12] The “Cat Fund” is a stable, albeit incomplete, source of reinsurance. It is designed only for hurricane losses. Insurers who participate in the Cat Fund have an annual deductible, which varies according to the exposures of each company, and an annual maximum payout. Insurers must, therefore, also purchase additional reinsurance, which is widely recognized as a cost of doing business in the state.

E. Sophisticated Catastrophe Modelling

Insurers also began to reassess the way they modelled catastrophes. Before Hurricane Andrew, insurers estimated the size of future losses using “experience” data, based only on what happened in the past. However, Andrew helped to prove that past data is a poor gauge for future catastrophe exposure. Today, catastrophe models generate thousands of sample hurricane events, track them across land with various wind speeds, assign probabilities to storm scenarios and landfall locations, and incorporate the individual insurer’s policy count and locations, to produce estimates of insured losses for an average event and a worst-case scenario.[13]

F. Building Codes and Mitigation

Before Hurricane Andrew, Florida law required all local governments to adopt and enforce a minimum building code that would ensure that Florida’s minimum standards were met.[14] Local governments could choose from four separate model codes. The state’s role was limited to adopting all or relevant parts of new editions of the four model codes. Local governments could amend and enforce their local codes as they saw fit.[15]

Hurricane Andrew destroyed many structures that were built according to code, demonstrating that Florida’s system of local codes was flawed. It was recognized that – in addition to saving lives and reducing property loss – statewide building codes reduce reliance on public disaster aid, ensure consistency for all building professionals, and enable communities to recover more quickly from disaster. The Governor appointed a study commission to review the system of local codes and make recommendations for modernization. The 1998 Legislature adopted the study commission’s recommendations for a single state building code and enhanced the oversight role of the state over local code enforcement.[16] The 2000 Legislature authorized implementation of the Building Code, and that first edition replaced all local codes on March 1, 2002.[17]

This new Building Code included stricter criteria, particularly regarding wind resistance, with key changes including mandatory impact-resistant windows and doors, reinforced roofs, improved roof-to-wall connections, and stricter standards for all building materials. In 2004, the state adopted the International Building Code as a model, adding some Florida-specific aspects.[18] New homes must be built according to the Building Code, and homeowners may be eligible for breaks on insurance rates when they retrofit their homes to comply with current standards.[19]

Further, the state encouraged homeowners to harden existing homes. The My Safe Florida Home Program was created in 2006.[20] This initiative offers free home inspections and grants up to $10,000 for strengthening homes against storms with impact-resistant doors and windows, aiming to reduce insurance costs through mandatory mitigation discounts. $150 million was initially allocated for the program, followed by an additional $200 million, enhancing services for seniors and low-income homeowners.[21] Since 2022 alone, the program has conducted over 104,000 free inspections, approved 38,000 grant applications, and allocated nearly $390 million in home hardening grants.[22]

4. AOBs and Rampant Claim Litigation

Everything finally was pointing in the right direction for a sustained market recovery but ultimately that would not be the case for Florida. In the decades following Andrew, there developed in Florida a so-called assignment of benefits (“AOB”) scheme to cheat insurers out of significant amounts of needed capital and surplus. An AOB allows a third party (assignee) to stand in the shoes of an insured and collect insurance proceeds directly from the insurance company. AOBs have been part of the Florida insurance marketplace for over 100 years and have been commonplace in the health insurance industry, where an insured assigns their benefits for a covered medical service to the health care provider so that the insurer pays the health care provider directly.[23]

Insurance policies typically impose certain duties on an insured in order to be covered under the policy, such as requiring an insured to file proof of loss, produce records, and submit to examination under oath. Florida courts increasingly held that an assignee did not have to comply with these obligations because the assignee agreed only to an assignment of the insurance benefits and did not agree to assume any of the duties under the insurance policy.[24]

Some assignees attempted to transfer broad rights under the policy and combine the AOB with authorization to perform services described only in general terms.[25] An AOB to receive payment under an insurance policy necessarily assigned the right to enforce payment. An unqualified assignment transferred all of the insured’s interest under the contract and the insured had no right to make any claim once the assignment was complete, unless authorized to do so by the assignee.[26] An insured who entered into an AOB may have unknowingly assigned their right to determine whether to file suit on the claim.

As such, many contractors purportedly would use AOBs to bypass homeowners and take legal action directly against insurers. This practice incentivized frivolous lawsuits (stimulated by a one-way attorney’s fees statute)[27] and skyrocketed the cost of claims. There developed a cottage industry of contractors, mitigation companies, and law firms to exploit the statutory scheme for profit. This manufactured event, once again, threatened the solvency of many insurers, discouraged new entrants to the market, and destabilized the availability of private reinsurance.

By 2020, it was reported that 20 percent to 50 percent rate increases on homeowners’ policies were being driven by excessive litigation and “unscrupulous actors.”[28] The Insurance Commissioner, citing NAIC data, declared that Florida had 8 percent of all homeowners’ claims in the United States, yet 76 percent of all homeowners’ claims lawsuits in the country.[29]

After some preliminary attempts to address these symptoms, the Florida Legislature focused on the root causes of this latest crisis. For instance, it repealed the one-way attorney fee provisions related to property insurance claims. In addition, it prohibited the assignment of post-loss insurance benefits (and attorney’s fees) under any residential or commercial property insurance policy issued on or after January 1, 2023.[30]

Legislation also tightened restrictions on roofing contractors and public adjusters to stem the increasing practice of blaming normal wear and tear on hurricanes or hailstorms to justify full replacement claims. It required earlier notice of property insurance claims, reducing the deadline for filing claims on any loss from three years to two years, and now one year.[31] Insurers, in turn, were required to respond more promptly to claims.

5. Sustained Net Underwriting Loss; Uptick in Insolvency

These reforms did not occur overnight. It took years for these reforms to be passed into law. This delay, certain court rulings, and the time it takes for reforms to have their intended effect, among other things, contributed to sustained underwriting losses and an uptick in receiverships. From 2017 to 2021, Florida domestic property insurers had cumulative net underwriting losses which exceeded negative $3 billion. The last time these carriers had positive net income was 2016. Rating organizations like A.M. Best took notice. On May 2, 2022, Best wrote that:

Florida personal property insurers have been reporting increasingly severe underwriting losses, owing to several challenges. Contrary to conventional perception, hurricane losses were not the primary culprit-results continue to erode despite the last major landfall occurring in 2018 (Hurricane Michael). The deterioration in performance is a by-product of the greater frequency of secondary perils (severe thunderstorms, wind, hail), higher reinsurance costs, escalating litigation costs, and building codes/laws that have been flouted by parties looking to profit. Insurers have responded with rate increases, underwriting adjustments, and targeted non-renewals while avoiding more problematic areas of the state.[32]

As mentioned, Florida experienced  an uptick in receiverships. In 2020, no companies were placed in receivership. In 2021, two companies were placed in receivership.[33] And, in 2022, five companies were placed in receivership.[34] Research undertaken by Demotech indicated “that the meteoric, annual incremental increases in new litigated claim frequency had caused, or significantly contributed to, the insolvencies.”[35]

A. Further Reinsurance Relief

Lawmakers saw the trends. In 2022, among other things, they created two reinsurance programs to complement the Cat Fund. First, they established the Reinsurance to Assist Policyholders (“RAP”) program.[36] The RAP program authorized a $2 billion reimbursement layer of reinsurance for hurricane losses directly below the mandatory layer of the Cat Fund.[37] All eligible insurers had to participate in the program.[38] Insurers did not pay premiums for program coverage but they had to reduce rates to reflect savings.

Second, the Legislature established the Florida Optional Reinsurance Assistance (“FORA”) program for the 2023 hurricane season.[39] The FORA program provided up to four layers of coverage for a portion of an insurer’s hurricane losses in exchange for premium at “reasonable” rates. The Legislature allocated up to $1 billion to support this program.[40]

B. Increased Regulatory Oversight

Also, the Legislature vested the Office of Insurance Regulation (the “Office”) with increased regulatory oversight. In 2022, the Legislature passed a bill creating a Property Insurance Stability Unit within the Office (the “Stability Unit”).[41] The stated purpose of this Unit is to aid in the detection and prevention of insurer insolvencies in the homeowners’ and condominium unit owners’ insurance market.[42]

The Stability Unit has five principal functions to further its purpose:

  1. Conduct target market exams when there is reason to believe that an insurer’s claims practices, rating practices, investment activities, or financial statements suggest the insurer may be in an unsound financial condition;
  2. Monitor closely all risk-based capital reports, own-risk solvency assessments, reinsurance agreements, and financial statements filed by insurers;
  3. Have primary responsibility to conduct annual catastrophe stress tests of all domestic insurers;
  4. Update required wind mitigation credits; and
  5. Review the causes of insolvency and business practices of insurers and make recommendations to prevent similar failures in the future.[43]

The next year, in 2023, the Legislature focused further on insurer accountability, passing a bill which among other things specified factors the Office may consider in determining whether the continued operation of an insurer were hazardous to its policyholders, creditors, or the general public. It specified actions the Office may take in determining an insurer’s financial condition and actions the Office may order an insurer to take to improve the insurer’s financial condition. It required property insurers to report to the Office any temporary suspension of writing new policies. Further, it prohibited officers and directors of an impaired or insolvent insurer from receiving a bonus from the insurer or its affiliates. Section 626.9541(1)(w), Florida Statutes, a statutory section within Florida’s Unfair Insurance Trade Practices Act, now provides as follows: 

1. Whether or not delinquency proceedings as to the insurer have been or are about to be initiated, but while such insolvency or impairment exists, no director or officer of an insurer, except with written permission of the office, shall authorize or permit the insurer to solicit or accept new or renewal insurance risks in this state after such director knew or reasonably should have known, that the insurer was insolvent or impaired.

2. Regardless of whether delinquency proceedings as to the insurer have been or are to be initiated, but while such insolvency or impairment exists, a director or an officer of an impaired insurer may not receive a bonus from such insurer, nor may such director or officer receive a bonus from a holding company or an affiliate that shares common ownership or control with such insurer.

3. As used in this paragraph, the term:

a. “Bonus” means a payment, in addition to an officer’s or a director’s usual compensation, which is in addition to any amounts contracted for or otherwise legally due.

b. “Impaired” includes impairment of capital or surplus, as defined in s. 631.011(12) and (13).

4. Any such director or officer, upon conviction of a violation of this paragraph, commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.[44]

Florida has seen emerging trends resulting from these changes. As of today, there are signs that the Florida property insurance market is stabilizing. From the beginning of 2024 through the beginning of April 2025, twelve new insurers have entered the market.[45] Capital investment is on the rise. Insurance rates have stabilized (and even decreased in some cases). Citizens has successfully offloaded more than 400,000 policies to private insurers over the last year, a major step in reducing the state’s exposure. Additionally, litigation is on the decline. Lawsuit filings against insurers are down 23 percent and are back to pre-2018 levels.[46]

6. Surfside Condominium Collapse

The June 24, 2021, collapse of the Champlain Towers South beachfront condominium in Surfside, Florida, which caused the deaths of 98 people dramatically affected the commercial residential insurance market. It was discovered that a lot of commercial properties were undervalued and so under-insured to their current value. Underwriters and brokers now focus more on insurance-to-value for condominium buildings, which has (in many instances) dramatically increased the cost of condominium policies.

The Legislature convened a Special Session during May 2022, and put in place a number of laws to bring condominium buildings up to code. For instance, Senate Bill 4-D created a state-wide inspection program for condominium buildings taller than three stories.[47] Starting in 2025, the buildings will go through a milestone inspection certification process when reaching 30 years of age, or 25 years if the building is located within three miles of the coast, and will be inspected again every 10 years afterward. The inspection records must be posted online and shared with tenants. Condominium associations will no longer be able to waive the requirement that they keep a reserve fund large enough to maintain the structural integrity of the building.[48]

The collapse and these measures have affected home ownership in the state. Insurance rates for condominiums on the coast have increased several-fold. Condominium associations have issued assessments to fund association reserves that had been under-funded or not funded at all. As a result, condominium ownership has become much more expensive, with some paying more in insurance and assessments than their monthly mortgage payment. Some have been forced to sell to cash buyers at massive discounts or risk foreclosure.[49] As with measures enacted after Hurricane Andrew, further reform may be needed to address these issues.

7. Conclusion

Florida has faced a variety of challenges to its homeowner’s insurance market. The Florida experience has shown that the path toward market stability is not the result of a single action. Rather, it is the result of a multifaceted approach, that has sought to address the root causes of Florida’s insurance crisis, such as rampant litigation abuse, fraud, and an unsustainable reinsurance market.

References

REFERENCES

[1] This Article is based in part on a panel presentation the author made at the 2025 Resolution Workshop of the International Association of Insurance Receivers in Dallas, Texas, on February 27, 2025.

[2] Michele Sansone, Remembering Hurricane Andrew’s Lessons, 30 Years Later, Fast Fast Forward (Aug. 8, 2022, https://axaxl.com/fast-fast-forward/articles/remembering-hurricane-andrews-lessons-30-years-later (a publication of AXA XL Risk Consulting)).

[3] Id.

[4] Lynne McChristian, Insurance Information Institute, Hurricane Andrew and Insurance: The Enduring Impact of an Historic Storm, at 2 (Aug. 2012).

[5] Id.

[6] 1993 Fla. Laws ch. 410, § 19 (statutory section since repealed).

[7] McChristian, supra note 4, at 6.

[8] QUASR Data, Florida Office of Insurance Regulation (Sept. 30, 2024).

[9] National insurers often carve out their Florida business into a separate company, insulating the parent company from losses in the hurricane-prone state. The Florida offshoots are known as “pup companies.” “Pups” have been allowed in Florida since 1996. Hurricane Insurance Affordability and Availability Act of 1996, 1996 Fla. Laws ch. 194.

[10] QUASR Data, Florida Office of Insurance Regulation (Sept. 30, 2024); Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., Florida Residential Property Market Share Report (Sept. 30, 2024), at 4. This analysis includes admitted insurers only; surplus lines companies are not included in the underlying market share calculations. These figures are otherwise based on the total insured value for policies with wind coverage.

[11] Fla. Stat. § 627.701(3).

[12] 1993 Fla. Laws ch. 409 (codified at Fla. Stat. § 215.55) (creating the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund under the State Board of Administration to reimburse insurers for a portion of their hurricane losses under homeowner’s, commercial multi-peril, and other property insurance polices).

[13] McChristian, supra note 4, at 15.

[14] Dep’t of Comm’y Aff., The Florida Building Commission Report to the 2006 Legislature, at 4 (2006), available at http://www.floridabuilding.org/fbc/publications/2006_Legislature_Rpt_rev2.pdf [hereinafter Commission Report].

[15] Id.

[16] 1998 Fla. Laws ch. 287, §§ 36 to 55. (currently codified at Fla. §§ 553.70 to 553.8991 as the Florida Building Codes Act).

[17] Commission Report, at 4.

[18] Fla. Admin. Code r. 9B-3.047 (now codified at Fla. Admin. Code r. 61G20-1.001).

[19] See, e.g., Fla. Stat. § 627.0629(1) (“A rate filing for residential property insurance must include actuarially reasonable discounts, credits, or other rate differentials, or appropriate reductions in deductibles, for properties on which fixtures or construction techniques demonstrated to reduce the amount of loss in a windstorm have been installed or implemented.”).

[20] 2006 Fla. Laws ch. 12, § 2 (codified at Fla. Stat. § 215.5586).

[21] 2022 Fla. Laws ch. 268, § 4(1) ($150 million funding); 2024 Fla. Laws ch. 107, § 2 ($200 million funding).

[22] Press Release, Fla. Dep’t of Fin. Servs., My Safe Florida Home Program Opens Grant Application Portal (June 30, 2024) (https://myfloridacfo.com/news/pressreleases/press-release-details/2024/06/30/my-safe-florida-home-program-opens-grant-application-portal#:~:text=Newly%20signed%20legislation%20provides%20an,million%20in%20home%20hardening%20grants).

[23] See generally A. Kenneth Levine, Assignment of Homeowners Policy Benefits in Florida, 27 FORC J. of Ins. L. & Reg’n (Spring 2016).

[24] Citizens Property Insurance Corporation v. Ifergane, 114 So. 3d 190 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012); Shaw v. State Farm Fire and Casualty, Co., 37 So. 3d 329, 332 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010).

[25] 2019 Fla. H.B. 7065, at 2 (May 28, 2019) (citation omitted).

[26] State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. Ray, 556 So. 2d 811, 813 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) (citing 4 Fla.Jur.2d, Assignments, § 23 (1978)).

[27] Michael J. Raudebaugh, Florida Eliminates One-Way Attorney’s Fees Statute in Bid to Stabilize Insurance Market (Jan. 11, 2023), https://www.clausen.com/florida-eliminates-one-way-attorneys-fees-statute-in-bid-to-stabilize-insurance-market/.

[28] Lisa Miller & Associates, Key Provisions of 2021 Insurance Consumer Protections (SB 76 & SB 1598) (Nov. 30, 2021), https://lisamillerassociates.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Key-Provisions-of-2021-Insurance-Consumer-Protections-SB-76-SB-1598-by-LMA.pdf.

[29] Amy O’Connor, NAIC Data: Florida Property Lawsuits Total 76% of Insurer Litigation in U.S., Ins. J. (Apr. 14, 2021), https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/southeast/2021/04/14/609721.htm).

[30] Fla. SB 2-A, Bill Analysis, at 44-45 (Dec. 12, 2022).

[31] Section 627.70132, Florida Statutes, now provides as follows:

A claim or reopened claim, but not a supplemental claim, under an insurance policy that provides property insurance, as defined in s. 624.604, including a property insurance policy issued by an eligible surplus lines insurer, for loss or damage caused by any peril is barred unless notice of the claim was given to the insurer in accordance with the terms of the policy within 1 year after the date of loss. A supplemental claim is barred unless notice of the supplemental claim was given to the insurer in accordance with the terms of the policy within 18 months after the date of loss.

[32] Troubled Florida Property Market Participants Under Immense Pressure, Best’s Comment., May 2, 2022, at 1.

[33] Florida, ex rel., Dep’t of Fin. Servs. v. Am. Capital Assurance Corp., No. 2021 CA 0641(Fla. 2nd Cir. Ct. Apr. 14, 2021) (Consent Order for liquidation); Florida, ex rel., Dep’t of Fin. Servs. v. Gulfstream Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., No. 2021 CA 001308 (Fla. 2nd Cir. Ct. July 28, 2021) (Consent Order for liquidation).

[34] Florida, ex rel., Dep’t of Fin. Servs. v. St. Johns Ins. Co., Inc., No. 2022 CA 0316 (Fla. 2nd Cir. Ct. Feb. 25, 2022) (Consent Order for liquidation); Florida, ex rel., Dep’t of Fin. Servs. v. Avatar Prop. and Cas. Ins. Co., No. 2022 CA 000366 (Fla. 2nd Cir. Ct. Mar. 14, 2022) (Consent Order for liquidation); Florida, ex rel., Dep’t of Fin. Servs. v. Southern Fid. Ins. Co., No. 2022 CA 001008 (Fla. 2nd Cir. Ct. June 15, 2022) (Consent Order for liquidation); Florida, ex rel., Dep’t of Fin. Servs. v. Weston Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., No. 2022 CA 001378 (Fla. 2nd Cir. Ct. Aug. 8, 2022) (Consent Order for liquidation); Florida, ex rel., Dep’t of Fin. Servs. v. FedNat Ins. Co., No. 2022 CA 001688 (Fla. 2nd Cir. Ct. Sept. 27, 2022) (Consent Order for liquidation).

[35] Joseph L. Petrelli, Carriers Were Litigated to Death. Our Research Project Uncovered How, The Demotech Difference, Spring 2025, at 22 (also positing that “technology has been harnessed in an effort to secure an increased volume and frequency of litigated claims”).

[36] 2022 Fla. Laws ch. 268, § 1 (codified at Fla. Stat. § 215.5551).

[37] Each insurer’s limit of the $2 billion in RAP coverage is their pro-rata market share among all insurers that participate in the RAP program. Fla. Stat. § 215.5551(2)(i).

[38] The RAP program expires July 1, 2025, if no General Revenue funds have been transferred to fund the RAP program. If such funds were transferred, the statute expires July 1, 2029, and all unencumbered RAP Program funds must be transferred back to the General Revenue Fund. Fla. Stat. § 215.5551(14).

[39] 2022 Fla. Laws ch. 271, § 1 (codified at Fla. Stat. § 215.5552).

[40] FORA insurers will be reimbursed for 100 percent of their covered losses from the two covered events with the largest losses in excess of their FORA retention, not to exceed their aggregate FORA limit. Fla. Stat. § 215.5552(4)(d).

[41] 2022 Fla. Laws ch. 268, § 19 (codified at Fla. Stat. § 627.7154).

[42] Fla. Stat. § 627.7154(1).

[43] Fla. Stat. § 627.7154(3).

[44] Fla. Stat. § 626.9541(1)(w)1.

[45] Press Release, Fla. Off. of Ins. Reg., Commissioner Mike Yaworsky Approves over 10 Property & Casualty Insurers to Enter the Market Following Historic Reforms (Jan. 27, 2025) (listing Mangrove Property Insurance Company, ASI Select Insurance Corp., Trident Reciprocal Exchange, Ovation Home Insurance Exchange, Manatee Insurance Exchange, Condo Owners Reciprocal Exchange, Orange Insurance Exchange, Orion180 Select Insurance Company, Orion180 Insurance Company, Mainsail Insurance Company, and Tailrow Insurance Exchange); Press Release, Fla. Off. of Ins. Reg., Commissioner Yaworsky Announces 12th Property Insurer Entering the Market Since Legislative Reforms (Apr. 7, 2025) (adding to the list Apex Star Reciprocal Exchange).

[46] Ron Hurtibise, Lawsuits Against Insurers Declined Again This Year. Will This Year’s Hurricanes Reverse the Trend?, So. Fla. Sun-Sentinel (Nov. 10, 2024).

[47] 2022 Fla. Laws ch. 269, § 3 (codified at Fla. Stat. § 553.899).

[48] 2023 Fla. Laws ch. 203, § 6 (codified at Fla. Stat. § 718.112).

[49] See generally Ron Hurtibise, Condo Association Insurance Costs Doubled Since 2022, New Data Shows, So. Fla. Sun Sentinel (Sept. 14, 2024) (providing further commentary on premium increases for condominium associations).